



Share Repurchases, Agency Costs, and Announcement Returns: Evidence from the FTSE 350

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Abstract

This study examines abnormal stock price returns surrounding share repurchase announcements for 84 FTSE 350 firms between 2020 and 2025. Using the market model against the FTSE 350 benchmark, cumulative abnormal returns are computed across six event windows. Contrary to established US evidence, abnormal returns are positive but statistically insignificant across all windows. Cross-sectional regressions find no significant relationship between agency cost proxies and firm-level abnormal returns. The results suggest the UK market does not systematically reward buyback announcements and that agency cost differences do not predict announcement returns in this sample.

Introduction

Share repurchases have become one of the dominant mechanisms through which listed firms return capital to shareholders. In the United States, open-market buybacks surpassed dividends as the primary payout channel by the late 1990s, a trend documented by Grullon and Michaely (2002) and confirmed by Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2014). The most widely cited evidence comes from Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), who find that buyback announcements generate statistically significant positive abnormal returns, consistent with the view that repurchases convey favourable private information about firm value. However, the majority of this evidence is drawn from US markets; whether UK investors respond in the same way remains an open question.

This paper addresses that gap by examining the stock price reaction to share repurchase announcements for 84 FTSE 350 firms between January 2020 and December 2025. Two research questions guide the analysis.

RQ1: Do buyback announcements generate statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)?

RQ2: Do agency cost characteristics of the announcing firm explain cross-sectional variation in those returns?

The second question is motivated by Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen predicts that the market should respond more favourably to repurchases by firms with the greatest potential for managers to waste resources, that is, firms with higher agency costs.

The principal findings are as follows. Cumulative abnormal returns are positive across all six event windows examined but fail to achieve statistical significance, suggesting the UK market

does not consistently reward buyback announcements as US studies have found. Following Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003), cross-sectional regressions using the selling, general, and administrative expense ratio and asset utilisation as agency cost proxies find no significant relationship between agency costs and announcement returns.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section I reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on share repurchases and agency costs, developing the two testable hypotheses. Section II describes the data, sample construction, and econometric methodology. Section III presents the event study and regression results. Section IV concludes with a discussion of the findings, their limitations, and opportunities for future research.

I. Literature Review

A. Share Repurchases: Motivations and Market Reactions

The theoretical starting point for any study of payout policy is Miller and Modigliani (1961). They demonstrate that under perfect capital markets, payout policy is irrelevant to firm value. In practice, however, market frictions such as taxes, information asymmetry, and agency conflicts mean that payout decisions do carry informational content. Repurchase announcements are of particular interest because they are discretionary: a firm's decision to buy back shares may convey private information about its value.

The event study evidence comes from Ikenberry et al. (1995), who document statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 3.54% over a five-day window centred on the announcement date for US firms, with additional long-run drift suggesting the market underreacts to the signal. Comment and Jarrell (1991) similarly find positive short-run announcement returns, attributing them to the signalling content of the repurchase decision. Grullon and Michaely (2002) extend this literature by arguing that repurchases have increasingly substituted for dividends as the dominant payout mechanism, a trend which Farre-

Mensa et al. (2014) confirm continued through the 21st century, peaking in 2007 before moderating after the financial crisis. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) provide survey evidence that managers themselves view repurchases as a more flexible payout tool than dividends, partly because they do not create the implicit commitment associated with regular dividend payments.

Critically, however, much of this evidence is drawn from US markets. UK firms operate under different regulatory and disclosure regimes, and buyback behaviour among large UK equities has received comparatively little attention. This motivates the first hypothesis of this study:

H1: Share repurchase announcements by FTSE 350 firms generate statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns.

B. Agency Costs and Payout Policy

The agency cost framework, formalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976), holds that the separation of ownership and control creates conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Managers with access to free cash flow may pursue empire-building, perquisite consumption, or value-destroying investments rather than returning surplus capital to shareholders. Jensen (1986) extends this argument directly to payout policy, proposing that distributions, whether dividends or repurchases, serve as a disciplining mechanism by reducing the cash available for managerial discretion. Easterbrook (1984) reaches a complementary conclusion, arguing that regular payouts force firms into capital markets for external financing, thereby subjecting management to the monitoring associated with new issuance.

Within this framework, share repurchases occupy a distinct position. Unlike dividends, which create an implicit commitment to ongoing payments, repurchases allow firms to distribute large, one-off cash surpluses without raising expectations of future payouts (Brav et al., 2005). This flexibility makes repurchases a particularly effective tool for addressing agency costs in

firms with temporarily elevated free cash flow. Nohel and Tarhan (1998) provide direct support, showing that announcement returns to tender-offer repurchases are concentrated in low-growth firms. This is consistent with the market rewarding a reduction in agency costs rather than responding to an undervaluation signal. Lie (2000) reinforces this finding, showing that repurchasing firms tend to hold excess funds relative to their industry peers prior to the announcement, and that announcement returns are positively related to the magnitude of these excess funds.

If investors interpret buyback announcements as a signal that agency costs are being addressed, then firms with higher agency costs before the announcement should see larger positive abnormal returns. This motivates the second hypothesis:

H2: Firms with higher agency costs at announcement experience larger cumulative abnormal returns.

C. Measuring Agency Costs: Proxies and Empirical Challenges

Agency costs cannot be observed directly, so testing H2 requires measurable proxies. The literature has converged on three key measures. Ang et al. (2000) propose the operating expense ratio (operating expenses divided by revenue) as a proxy for managerial perquisite consumption and operational inefficiency, alongside asset utilisation (revenue divided by total assets) to capture asset deployment efficiency. Singh and Davidson (2003) refine this approach by substituting the SG&A ratio for the broader operating expense measure, arguing that SG&A expenses more precisely capture discretionary managerial spending. Neither proxy is without limitation. The SGA ratio is sensitive to industry composition and to disclosure practices: unlike US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) do not mandate a separate SGA line item, meaning that many UK firms do not report this figure. Asset utilisation is mechanically lower for capital-heavy firms

and largely meaningless for financial firms, whose balance sheets consist primarily of financial assets rather than operating assets used to generate revenue. Both considerations shape the sample construction and variable definitions adopted in this study.

II. Data and Methodology

A. Sample Selection and Index selection

This study examines the most recent share repurchase announcement per firm across FTSE 350 constituents between January 2020 and December 2025. The FTSE 350, comprising the 350 largest London Stock Exchange companies by market capitalisation, was selected to capture a broad cross-section of large and mid-cap UK listed equities. The index also serves as the market benchmark throughout, providing the closest available proxy for the expected returns of the firms studied. Announcement dates were identified using the Bloomberg Terminal's equity screening function, yielding an initial sample of 84 firms. Bloomberg's equity screening function returns the most recent repurchase announcement date per firm; this has the additional benefit of ensuring independence of observations across the cross-sectional tests.

The full sample of 84 firms is used for the event study (Section B). For the cross-sectional regression (Section C), 35 investment trusts, closed-end funds, and financial sector firms are excluded on the grounds that accounting-based agency cost proxies are not economically meaningful for such entities, as discussed in Section I.C. One additional firm, Domino's Pizza Group plc, is excluded because negative book equity produces an uninterpretable market-to-book ratio, yielding a regression-eligible sample of 48 firms.

B. Event Study Methodology

The event study employs the standard market model to estimate expected returns (e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995). The implementation follows Pandey (2024), who applies the same

framework to Indian repurchase announcements. Daily adjusted closing prices were sourced from Yahoo Finance for each firm over a window anchored to its specific announcement date. Daily returns are computed as the percentage change in adjusted closing prices across the full price series. For each firm, parameters α_i and β_i are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) over a pre-event estimation window of $[t - 120, t - 16]$ trading days. A 15-trading-day gap between the estimation window end and the announcement date is preserved to prevent pre-announcement price movements from contaminating the parameter estimates. The market model takes the form:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \times R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (\text{I})$$

Where R_{it} is the daily return on firm i and R_{mt} is the daily return on the FTSE 350 index. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between each firm's actual return and its market-model-expected return:

$$AR_{it} = R_{it} - (\alpha_i + \beta_i \times R_{mt}) \quad (\text{II})$$

Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are aggregated across six event windows, $[t-1, t+1]$, $[t-2, t+2]$, $[t-3, t+3]$, $[t-5, t+5]$, $[t-10, t+10]$, and $[t-15, t+15]$, defined in trading days relative to the announcement date. Average abnormal returns (AARs) are computed daily by averaging AR_{it} across all firms with valid observations. Statistical significance is assessed via a two-tailed t-test under the null hypothesis that the mean CAR or AAR equals zero.

C. Cross-Sectional Regression

To test H2, the CAR over $[t-5, t+5]$ is regressed on two agency cost proxies and three control variables. The $[t-5, t+5]$ window is selected to capture the short-run market reaction while limiting noise from unrelated events that may affect wider windows. The specification takes the form:

$$CAR_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SGA/Revenue) + \beta_2(Revenue/Assets) + \beta_3(Log(Mkt\ Cap)) + \beta_4(Leverage) + \beta_5(M/B\ Ratio) + \varepsilon_i \quad (III)$$

The SGA-to-revenue ratio proxies direct agency costs following Singh and Davidson (2003), who refine the operating expense measure introduced by Ang et al. (2000) to isolate discretionary managerial spending; a positive coefficient ($\beta_1 > 0$) is consistent with H2. Asset utilisation (revenue divided by total assets) proxies indirect agency costs, where lower values indicate less efficient resource deployment; a negative coefficient ($\beta_2 < 0$) supports H2. Log market capitalisation controls for firm size, debt-to-total-assets controls for capital structure, and market-to-book ratio controls for growth expectations and potential undervaluation. All accounting data is sourced from Bloomberg and refers to the fiscal year most recently completed prior to each announcement date.

A recognised limitation is that IFRS, unlike US GAAP, do not mandate separate disclosure of SGA expenses, as discussed in Section I.C. Many UK firms incorporate such costs within broader administrative expense categories, reducing the SGA subsample from 48 to 32 firms. To address this, a fourth model substitutes the operating expense ratio (total operating expenses divided by revenue), returning to the broader proxy employed by Ang et al. (2000). This measure, while less precise in isolating discretionary spending, recovers the full non-financial sample and provides a robustness check on the primary results; a positive coefficient would nonetheless support H2. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the influence of outliers, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC3) are employed across all specifications.

III. Results and Analysis

A. Event Study Results

Table I reports summary statistics for the market model parameter estimates across the 84 sample firms. The mean estimated beta is 1.0216, with a standard deviation of 0.4977 and a range of -1.2060 to 2.9820 . The mean alpha is close to zero (-0.03% per day), consistent with the market model assumption that firm-specific expected returns are captured by the market factor. The average R^2 of 0.2572 indicates that the FTSE 350 index explains roughly one-quarter of daily return variation for a typical sample firm during the estimation window. All firms have 105 trading day observations in the estimation window, confirming sufficient data for reliable parameter estimation.

TABLE I
Market Model Estimation Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
α (Alpha)	-0.0003	-0.0003	0.0017	-0.0048	0.0067
β (Beta)	1.0216	1.0431	0.4977	-1.2060	2.9820
R^2	0.2572	0.2231	0.1705	0.0017	0.7043
Observations (N)	105	105	0	105	105

OLS market model estimates ($R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \times R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it}$) over $[t-120, t-16]$ for 84 FTSE 350 firms announcing buybacks between January 2020 and December 2025. R_{mt} is the daily return on the FTSE 350 index.

Table II presents daily average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative AARs across the full $[t-15, t+15]$ event window. The daily AARs are generally small in magnitude and do not exhibit a pronounced pattern of positive returns clustering around the announcement date. This pattern is more clearly visible in Figure 1. On day 0 itself, the AAR is $+0.22\%$ ($t = 1.36$), positive yet statistically insignificant. Only four individual days achieve significance at the 10% level or better: day -10 ($+0.35\%$, $t = 1.93$, $p < 0.10$), day -9 ($+0.24\%$, $t = 1.72$, $p < 0.10$), day -6 (-0.48% , $t = -2.47$, $p < 0.05$), and day $+7$ ($+0.42\%$, $t = 1.75$, $p < 0.10$). The cumulative AAR drifts upward over the full window, reaching $+0.81\%$ by day $+15$, but this accumulation is gradual and irregular, with no concentration of returns around the announcement date. By contrast, Ikenberry et al. (1995) report a CAR of 3.54% concentrated within the narrow $[t-2, t+2]$ window, suggesting a swift and pronounced market reaction to US repurchase announcements.

TABLE II
Average Abnormal Returns Surrounding Share Repurchase Announcements

Day	AAR (%)	Std. Err. (%)	t-Statistic	N	CAR (%)	Significance
-15	0.18%	0.15%	1.17	84	0.18%	-
-14	-0.05%	0.14%	-0.37	84	0.13%	-
-13	-0.12%	0.15%	-0.84	84	0.01%	-
-12	-0.17%	0.20%	-0.82	84	-0.16%	-
-11	-0.05%	0.29%	-0.18	84	-0.21%	-
-10	0.35%	0.18%	1.93	84	0.14%	*
-9	0.24%	0.14%	1.72	84	0.38%	*
-8	0.14%	0.16%	0.88	84	0.52%	-
-7	-0.04%	0.20%	-0.20	84	0.48%	-
-6	-0.48%	0.20%	-2.47	84	0.00%	**
-5	0.14%	0.15%	0.95	84	0.14%	-
-4	-0.06%	0.28%	-0.20	84	0.08%	-
-3	-0.06%	0.17%	-0.32	84	0.03%	-
-2	0.08%	0.15%	0.52	84	0.10%	-
-1	0.16%	0.18%	0.92	84	0.27%	-
0	0.22%	0.16%	1.36	84	0.49%	-
1	0.01%	0.29%	0.02	84	0.49%	-
2	0.06%	0.17%	0.35	84	0.55%	-
3	0.24%	0.16%	1.47	84	0.79%	-
4	-0.08%	0.14%	-0.55	84	0.71%	-
5	-0.29%	0.32%	-0.90	84	0.42%	-
6	-0.16%	0.22%	-0.72	84	0.26%	-
7	0.42%	0.24%	1.75	84	0.68%	*
8	0.00%	0.20%	-0.02	84	0.68%	-
9	0.16%	0.17%	0.91	84	0.83%	-
10	0.04%	0.19%	0.19	84	0.87%	-
11	-0.05%	0.15%	-0.34	84	0.82%	-
12	-0.06%	0.21%	-0.29	84	0.76%	-
13	0.21%	0.22%	0.98	84	0.97%	-
14	-0.32%	0.22%	-1.46	84	0.65%	-
15	0.16%	0.21%	0.77	84	0.81%	-

Daily AARs and CARs over $[t-15, t+15]$ for 84 FTSE 350 buyback announcements, January 2020–December 2025. Abnormal returns are computed as $AR_{it} = R_{it} - (\alpha_i + \beta_i \times R_{mt})$, with market model parameters estimated over $[t-120, t-16]$. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed)

Table III reports average *CARs* across six symmetric event windows. The results provide a direct test of H1. *CARs* are positive across all six windows examined: +0.39% over $[t-1, t+1]$, +0.52% over $[t-2, t+2]$, +0.70% over $[t-3, t+3]$, +0.42% over $[t-5, t+5]$, +1.08% over $[t-10, t+10]$ and +0.81% over $[t-15, t+15]$. The highest t-statistic is 1.66 for the $[t-3, t+3]$

window ($p=0.1001$), falling short of rejection at the 10% level. The null hypothesis that the mean CAR equals zero, across all observed windows, cannot be rejected.




Figure 1. *AARs* for 84 FTSE 350 firms over $[t-15, t+15]$. Solid bars denote significance at 10% or better (two-tailed); hatched bars are insignificant.

TABLE III
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Event Window

Event Window	N	Average CAR (%)	t-Statistic	p-value	Significance
$[t-1, t+1]$	84	0.39%	1.01	0.3146	-
$[t-2, t+2]$	84	0.52%	1.41	0.1637	-
$[t-3, t+3]$	84	0.70%	1.66	0.1001	-
$[t-5, t+5]$	84	0.42%	0.65	0.5207	-
$[t-10, t+10]$	84	1.08%	1.15	0.2549	-
$[t-15, t+15]$	84	0.81%	0.67	0.5049	-

Average *CARs* across six symmetric event windows for 84 FTSE 350 buyback announcements, January 2020–December 2025. The t-statistic tests whether the mean CAR differs from zero ($n-1$ degrees of freedom). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed).

The absence of significant *AARs* on or around day 0 is noteworthy. If buyback announcements conveyed material new information, abnormal returns should concentrate near the announcement date. Instead, the daily *AAR* pattern is dispersed, with pockets of significance at days $-10, -9, -6$ and $+7$, suggesting sampling variation rather than a systematic market response. These results contrast with the US evidence of Ikenberry et al. (1995), who

document abnormal returns of 3.54% over a $[t-2, t+2]$ event window. Several institutional features of the UK equity market may explain this divergence from US evidence. Firstly, UK companies require prior shareholder approval before executing share repurchases (Companies Act 2006, s.701). Such an authority is granted or renewed at the annual general meeting, meaning investors may already price in the possibility of a buyback before any explicit announcement of a buyback. Secondly, UK regulation demands greater transparency of buyback execution. Under the Market Abuse Regulation, UK firms must disclose each buyback transaction including the number of shares purchased, the price paid, and the date. In the US, by contrast, managers may announce an open-market programme with no obligation to follow through or to report transaction-level details. This asymmetry in disclosure reduces the information gap between UK firms and their investors. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) argue that the resulting transparency weakens the signalling power of the initial announcement, as UK managers cannot quietly exploit perceived undervaluation in the way their US counterparts can. Finally, UK firms have historically favoured dividends as the primary payout channel. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) show that repurchases constituted just 34% of total EU15 (the fifteen pre-2004 enlargement EU member states) payouts by 2005, compared with 63% in the US (Farre-Mensa et al., 2014). Buyback announcements in the UK may therefore be interpreted as complements to an existing dividend policy rather than as standalone signals, diminishing their information content.

B. Cross-Sectional Regression Results

Table IV reports the results of four OLS regression specifications in which the dependent variable is the *CAR* over the $[-5, +5]$ window. In Model 1, the SGA ratio carries a negative coefficient (-0.0447 , robust $SE = 0.0849$) that is directionally inconsistent with H2 but statistically insignificant, with an R^2 of 0.146 and an F -statistic of 1.154. Model 2 substitutes asset utilisation, which produces a negative coefficient (-0.0139 , robust $SE =$

0.0207) that is directionally consistent with H2 but equally insignificant. Model 3 includes both proxies simultaneously; both coefficients remain negative, neither achieves significance, and the adjusted R^2 of 0.0277 confirms negligible explanatory power. Model 4 addresses the fact that many UK firms do not report SGA as a discrete line item by substituting the operating expense ratio, expanding the sample from 32 to 48 firms. The coefficient on the operating expense ratio is essentially zero (+0.0004, robust $SE = 0.0335$) and wholly insignificant. Across all four models, no agency cost proxy or control variable achieves statistical significance at even the 10% level, and no F -statistic rejects the null that all slope coefficients are jointly zero. H2 is not supported.

The absence of cross-sectional explanatory power may reflect several factors. First, and most fundamentally, the event study finds no significant CAR across any window; when announcement returns are themselves insignificant, there is little cross-sectional variation for agency cost proxies to explain. Second, the sample is considerably smaller than comparable US studies; Ikenberry et al. (1995) examine 1,239 announcements, whereas Models 1–3 contain just 32 observations and even the expanded Model 4 only 48, limiting statistical power. Third, the agency cost proxies employed were developed using US data; Ang et al. (2000) introduce the operating expense ratio and asset utilisation as agency cost measures for small, closely held firms, while Singh and Davidson (2003) refine the former to the SGA-to-sales ratio for large US corporations. Their applicability to UK listed firms, which operate under different accounting standards, governance norms, and ownership structures, is not guaranteed. The reduction from 48 to 32 firms due to missing SGA data illustrates how UK disclosure practices limit the transferability of these proxies.

Table IV
Cross-Sectional Regression of CAR(-5,+5) on Agency Cost Proxies
Dependent variable: CAR(-5,+5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SGA/Revenue	-0.0447 (0.0849)		-0.1015 (0.0989)	
OpEx/Revenue				0.0004 (0.0335)
Revenue/Assets		-0.0139 (0.0207)	-0.0268 (0.0242)	-0.0071 (0.0152)
Log(Mkt Cap)	0.0302 (0.0263)	0.0264 (0.0258)	0.0310 (0.0262)	0.0157 (0.0165)
Leverage	-0.0334 (0.0944)	-0.0093 (0.0845)	-0.0572 (0.0964)	0.0028 (0.0707)
M/B Ratio	-0.0073 (0.0049)	-0.0069 (0.0049)	-0.0069 (0.0049)	-0.0067 (0.0041)
Constant	-0.0503 (0.1015)	-0.0467 (0.1013)	-0.0041 (0.1094)	-0.0250 (0.0725)
Agency proxy	SGA	Asset Util.	Both	OpEx
Sample	SGA firms	SGA firms	SGA firms	Full sample
Observations	32	32	32	48
R^2	0.1460	0.1515	0.1845	0.1102
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.0195	0.0258	0.0277	0.0042
<i>F</i> Statistic	1.154 (4; 27)	1.205 (4; 27)	1.177 (5; 26)	1.040 (5; 42)

OLS regressions of CAR(-5,+5) on agency cost proxies for FTSE 350 buyback announcements, January 2020–December 2025. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1–3 use the SGA subsample ($n = 32$); Model 4 uses the full non-financial sample ($n = 48$). Domino's Pizza excluded due to negative book equity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed).

IV. Conclusion

This study examines whether share repurchase announcements generate abnormal returns for FTSE 350 firms between January 2020 and December 2025, and whether agency cost measures explain cross-sectional variation in those returns.

A. Summary of Findings

Average CARs are positive across all six event windows, ranging from +0.39% at $[t-1, t+1]$ to +1.08% at $[t-10, t+10]$, but none are statistically significant. H1 is therefore not supported: there is no evidence that UK buyback announcements generate significant short-run abnormal

returns. This contrasts with the short-run announcement returns documented by Ikenberry et al. (1995), who report a CAR of 3.54% over the $[t-2, t+2]$ window for US firms.

The cross-sectional regression finds no significant relationship between agency cost proxies and $CAR[-5, +5]$ in any specification. No variable achieves significance at even the 10% level and F -statistics are insignificant. H2 is therefore not supported. These null results contrast with Nohel and Tarhan (1998) and Lie (2000), who find evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis.

B. Limitations

Several limitations apply. The exclusion of 35 financial firms and investment trusts from the regression, whilst consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003), reduces the sample to 48 firms limiting statistical power. The sample period encompasses COVID-19, post-Brexit adjustment, and the 2022–2023 interest rate cycle, introducing volatility that a time-invariant market model may not fully capture. Additionally, many UK firms do not report SGA as a discrete line item, reducing the SGA subsample further and potentially introducing measurement error. Finally, the one-announcement-per-firm design limits observations and prevents analysis of whether market reactions vary across successive programmes.

C. Future Research

A panel dataset covering all FTSE 350 repurchase announcements over a longer horizon would increase statistical power and permit firm fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Future work could also examine whether the signalling value of repurchases differs across interest rate regimes and test long-run post-announcement performance in the UK following the methodology of Ikenberry et al. (1995). Additionally, further work could investigate whether the magnitude and frequency of repurchases influence the market response, as Pandey (2024) explores in the Indian context.

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